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ABSTRACT 
Nathan W. Dean:  Fairness and the Distribution of Primary Goods 
(Under the direction of Susan Bickford, Michael Lienesch, and Jeff Spinner-Halev) 
 
 I consider whether any one of the schemes of distributive justice envisioned by John 
Rawls, Robert Nozick, or G.A. Cohen is truly fair.  By means of a close and critical reading 
of their work on distributive justice, I conclude that their schemes of distributive justice in 
some instances fail to correct for elements of unfairness and at other times introduce 
unfairness in the furtherance of other largely unacknowledged ends.  More specifically, I (1) 
describe the ways in which Rawls, Nozick, and Cohen fail to show us what a fair scheme of 
distributive justice would look like, (2) sketch what I take to be a truly fair (though 
unappealing) scheme of distributive justice, and, (3) (in conclusion) suggest that the 
unwillingness or inability of Rawls, Nozick, and Cohen to be constrained by fairness 
highlights the potential disutility of fairness as a major determinant in the proper distribution 
of primary goods.   
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 I. Introduction:  
In this thesis I consider whether any one of the schemes of distributive justice 
envisioned by John Rawls, Robert Nozick, or G.A. Cohen is truly fair.  While each of these 
theorists uses the language of fairness I conclude that their schemes of distributive justice in 
some instances fail to correct for elements of unfairness and at other times introduce 
unfairness in the furtherance of other largely unacknowledged ends.  My goal is to describe 
the ways in which Rawls, Nozick, and Cohen fail to show us what a fair scheme of 
distributive justice would look like.  I would also like to suggest that their unwillingness or 
inability to be constrained by fairness highlights the potential disutility of fairness (and 
possibly justice as well) as a major determinant in the proper distribution of primary goods. 
A. Some Preliminary Thoughts on Distributional Fairness: 
In my view we are only right to call a thing fair if and only if it results from the 
actions or inactions of impartial agents whose actions or inactions, by definition, neither 
reflect nor perpetuate the taint of either force or fraud.  Likewise, I believe that we are only 
right to call a thing unfair if and only if it results from the actions or inactions of partial 
agents whose actions or inactions, by definition, reflect or perpetuate the taint of either force 
or fraud.  Finally, I also believe that things can be neither fair nor unfair (though possibly 
undeserved) when, as in the case of Nature or happenstance, they do not result from the 
actions or inactions of agents, whether they be partial or impartial.1  My foundational and 
                                                 
1
 Rawls does, to some degree, anticipate the distinctions that I want to make between that which results from 
impartial agency, partial agency, and non-agency when he acknowledges that “[t]he natural distribution is 
neither just nor unjust; nor is it unjust that persons are born into society at some particular position.  These are 
simply natural facts.  What is just or unjust is the way that institutions deal with these facts.”  (Rawls 1999, 87).  
2 
operating belief2 is that distributive fairness, the elimination of the impact of force or fraud 
on distributions, is a significantly less appropriate tool for the distribution of primary goods 
than a moral sense of what ought to be the case.  The moral sense that I have in mind would 
require us to (1) to justify the rules and policies governing distributions on the basis of their 
contribution to human flourishing (as abstract a concept as that may be) and (2) to proceed 
with the implementation of rules and policies that satisfy (1) even if doing so results in a net 
increase in distributional unfairness.   
For myself (and for those who currently agree with my understanding of fairness) we 
call a thing unfair (and really mean it) when it has been influenced by the force or fraud of 
some agent and call another thing fair (and really mean it) where/when the force or fraud of 
some agent is absent.  It is with this considered sense of fairness that we distinguish between 
(1) the good and bad things that simply happen(ed) to us by virtue of good and bad luck and 
(2) the good and bad things that happen(ed) to us by virtue of the force or fraud of 
individuals or groups—the former being fair (or, in actuality, not unfair) and the latter being 
unfair.  Despite these considered distinctions we often find ourselves labeling things “unfair” 
in the normal course when what we really mean is that these things are both undeserved and 
possibly worthy of some form of correction consistent with our moral sense.   
When a rich man finds a winning lottery ticket in the subway or a poor man is struck 
by lightning we often say “now, that was unfair”3 but if we examine our thoughts we may 
recognize two things:  First, we may understand that neither situation is in fact unfair because 
                                                                                                                                                       
What disturbs Nozick (and me) about this understanding of Rawls’s is that he thinks that justice as fairness 
actually requires the elimination and exploitation of the impact of avowedly not unjust natural facts (genetic and 
social) on distributions.   
 
2
 This is a belief on my part that extends beyond the scope of this Thesis.  
 
3
 The converse is also true, we might (loosely) remark that “it’s only fair” when a scoundrel gets struck by 
lightning or a saint experiences a miraculous recovery.   
3 
no (non-cosmic) agent tipped the scales to the benefit of the rich man or to the detriment of 
the poor man, and, second, we may understand that it isn’t the considered sense of fairness 
that accounts for our uneasiness about this state of affairs but a more basic (and not merely 
fairness-oriented) sense of what ought and ought not to happen to our fellow human beings.4 
 Another way to put all of this is to distinguish between a thing that is unfair and a 
thing that is merely undeserved.  I want to draw attention to the difference between Situation 
A in which I am $20 richer because I stole $20 from you (unfair) and Situation B in which I 
am $20 richer because I found $20 lying on the sidewalk (merely undeserved). 5  I think that 
many of us have a sense that there is a meaningful difference between Situations A and B 
based on the considered sense of fairness and I want to get significant mileage out of that 
sense.  We think it unfair that I am $20 richer in Situation A because I employed force or 
fraud in order to obtain your $20 and fair (or not unfair) that I am $20 richer in Situation B 
because in that instance I was merely lucky.6  At the risk of oversimplifying my own project, 
almost all that I want to do is to illustrate how Rawls, Nozick, and Cohen fail to treat the 
society-sized non-metaphorical versions of Situations A and B as the considered sense of 
fairness would dictate.  I say “almost all” because I also want to suggest the ethical vacuity of 
a society that distributes or redistributes primary goods solely on the basis of the considered 
(and I think very real and correct) sense of fairness.  My point is not that there is a problem 
                                                 
4
 We also need to understand that the presence of human agency does not always imply force or fraud.  If the 
rich man trades the poor man his umbrella for the poor man’s lottery ticket and the umbrella attracts the 
lightning while the lottery ticket yields a fortune no human agent has perpetuated a force or a fraud and the 
results remain fair even though unfortunate, unsettling, and possibly worthy of some correction.   
 
5
 I use $20 simply because it seems like a significant amount of money that one might encounter on the 
sidewalk but my point in this example and throughout this thesis is the same whether we’re dealing with $20, 
$20 billion, or all the money (or primary goods) in the world.  
 
6
 I also think that we have a sense that we can justify a demand that I return your stolen Situation A $20 on the 
basis of fairness and that we cannot justify a demand that I give to you or share with you my acquired Situation 
B $20 on the basis of fairness.  The idea being that it is fair to remedy the unfair thing and that it is unfair 
(though not necessarily wrong) to augment the merely undeserved (and not unfair) thing.  
4 
with the considered sense of fairness but that there is a problem with blindly accepting that 
fairness (and maybe even justice itself) should solely or primarily determine the proper 
distribution of primary goods.  
 While guaranteeing fairness through the universalization of impartiality and the 
rectification of all that results from force or fraud is easy (as easy as ideal theory can be), 
guaranteeing the world as it ought to be is a far more daunting endeavor (even in terms of 
ideal theory).  I agree that fairness is a very important concept but I do not believe that 
guaranteeing fairness or ridding the world of unfairness (the same thing) is (1) enough to 
ensure that everyone is treated as he or she ought to be treated, or, (2) the best way to 
consider issues of distributive justice if, as I think it ought to be, our ultimate end is universal 
or widespread human flourishing. 
B. Roadmap:  
My goal is not to describe and discuss each and every difference between Rawls, 
Nozick, and Cohen on the issue of distributive justice.  Instead I want to think about how 
they explicitly and implicitly regard and treat the notion of moral arbitrariness—a notion 
that bears an interesting and crucial relationship to fairness.  Moral arbitrariness is interesting 
because it can mean different things to different theorists in part because things can be 
arbitrary in different ways.  For instance, we might call something random-arbitrary (I draw 
a card from an unstacked deck and the designation of the card that I receive is arbitrary in the 
sense that it is random) or capricious-arbitrary (I draw a card from a stacked deck and the 
designation of the card that I receive is arbitrary in the sense that it is a capricious result—
metaphorically speaking, what I drew was the result of some force or fraud perpetuated by 
5 
the dealer).7  Moral arbitrariness is also crucial in that it is usually in the language of moral 
arbitrariness that theorists express their distributive justice fairness determinations and it is 
important to note whether they consider either or both forms of moral arbitrariness, random 
and capricious, to be unfair.  As we proceed, I want to keep an eye out for what Rawls, 
Nozick, and Cohen seem to consider morally arbitrary, how they treat those things that they 
call morally arbitrary, and how well their definitions and proposed treatments comport with 
the considered sense of fairness.  By way of preview I’ll say now that everything that is 
random-arbitrary fits within the considered sense of fairness (meaning nothing truly random 
should strike us as unfair8) and that everything that is capricious-arbitrary strike us as unfair.9  
I’ll also say by way of preview that I think that Rawls and Cohen violate the considered 
sense of fairness by seeking to exploit or eliminate random-arbitrary features of society while 
Nozick violates the considered sense of fairness in that he does not necessarily seek to 
eliminate all of the capricious-arbitrary features of society.  
Having said that fairness determinations are often couched in the language of moral 
arbitrariness and introduced the notions of random-arbitrariness and capricious-arbitrariness, 
                                                 
7
 My understanding of the random-arbitrary (good or bad hand) and capricious-arbitrary (stacked deck) 
distinction is based largely on comments made by David Schmidtz in his book Elements of Justice.  (Schmidtz 
2006, 217-18).  For my purposes (and for his as well) random-arbitrary and capricious-arbitrary stand in as 
short-hand for the situations where a thing is good or bad independent of any force or fraud by an agent on the 
one hand and the situation where a thing is good or bad as a result of some force or fraud by an agent on the 
other.   
 
8
 Please note that I am most definitely not saying that we do not or should not feel compelled to remedy certain 
random occurrences.  My point is simply that our desire to remedy certain random occurrences doesn’t really 
have anything to do with fairness as properly and meaningfully distinguished from our much larger (and more 
important) sense of what ought to be case and what ought not to be case.   
 
9
 For example, Situation B is random-arbitrary because it is simply a matter of undeserved luck that I came to 
be $20 richer in that instance while Situation A is capricious-arbitrary because I came to be $20 richer in that 
instance only by forcing you to give me the $20 or tricking you into giving me the $20 by means of fraudulent 
misrepresentations.  The bigger picture in all of this that I will get into below is that important things in life are 
like Situations A and B—the influence of discrimination on the distribution of primary goods is capricious-
arbitrary like Situation A and the influence of the fact that some people (like me) are born with an innate 
inaptitude for mathematics on the distribution of primary goods is (in most instances) random-arbitrary like 
Situation B.   
6 
I want to also point out how I see these notions interacting with the theorists’ treatment of the 
concepts of natural endowments, social endowments, and social contingencies.  Typically 
these terms come with a “morally arbitrary” in front of them (as in “morally arbitrary natural 
endowments”) and sometimes the terms social endowments and social contingencies are used 
interchangeably even though I think that it is best to regard these as referring to two different 
ideas.  I find it most useful to understand these concepts as follows: 
o Natural Endowments:  (how one does in the “natural lottery”)  Our natural 
endowments are those attributes we are born with rather than born into.  For instance, 
some are born with more innate aptitude for mathematics or music and others less and 
some are born able-bodied while others are born disabled.  
o Social Endowments:  (how one does in the “social lottery”)  Our social endowments 
are those attributes that we are born into.  For instance, it takes social construction for 
different chromosomes to indicate different sexes and even more social construction 
to come up with gender.  We are born into (rather than “born with”) sexes, genders, 
families, ethnic groups, races, social classes etc.   
o Social Contingencies:  (how one does in the “everyday luck lottery”)  Our social 
contingencies are the chance things that happen to us throughout life.  For instance, 
illnesses, accidents, or being in the right place at the right time or the wrong place at 
the wrong time.  In some cases our natural endowments and/or social endowments 
render us predisposed to these contingencies and in other cases they are completely 
unrelated (contrast a genetic predisposition for asthma, being born into a family of 
chain-smokers, and suffering debilitating asthma attacks with suffering brain damage 
after getting hit in the head by a foul ball at a baseball game).  
 
Considering the question of whether or not we should allow one or more of these concepts to 
influence the distribution of primary goods we get a different answer from all three theorists 
at issue in this thesis and yet another distinct answer through application of the considered 
sense of fairness.  First, Rawls wants to eliminate the influence of social endowments and 
social contingencies on distributions and to exploit the influence of natural endowments on 
distributions in a particular way (the difference principle).  Second, Cohen wants to eliminate 
the influence of any kind of lottery (any kind of luck in terms of endowments or 
contingencies) on distributions.  Third, Nozick does not want to eliminate or exploit the 
7 
influence of natural endowments on distributions but does want to eliminate the influence of 
certain social endowments (and possibly certain social contingencies highly related to social 
endowments) on distributions in circumscribed ways.10  Lastly, the considered sense of 
fairness tracks the aforementioned random-arbitrary/capricious-arbitrary distinction and 
holds that we should not eliminate or exploit the influence on distributions of any natural 
endowments on distributions (because they can only be random-arbitrary11), that we should 
not eliminate or exploit the influence on distributions of any social endowments or social 
contingencies which happen to be random-arbitrary, and that we should eliminate (and not 
merely exploit) the influence on distributions of any social endowments or social 
contingencies which happen to be capricious-arbitrary.  The considered sense of fairness 
focuses less on what the influence on distributions results from (Nature or society12) and 
more upon whether or not the deck has been stacked in favor of a particular distribution or 
stacked against another.   
The remainder of this thesis conforms to the following structure:  In Section II 
(Rawls) I (A) describe the Rawlsian conception of distributive justice as it is depicted in his 
second principle of justice, (B) consider the critiques of the Rawlsian conception offered by 
Nozick and Cohen, and (C) offer my own critique of the Rawlsian conception and of the 
critiques in line with what I’ve called the considered sense of fairness; in Section III (Nozick) 
                                                 
10
 What I am doing here with Rawls, Cohen, and Nozick is understanding the implications of their various 
comments on distributive justice and assigning them these positions even though they are not always as precise 
as I have been in delineating between natural endowments, social endowments, and social contingencies or 
between their elimination and exploitation.    
 
11
 Please note that I believe that the considered sense of fairness would treat those attributes that we are born 
with but that result from social factors as social endowments rather than natural endowments.  Here I am 
thinking (mostly) about children who are born with AIDS or addicted to drugs and similar situations.  Like all 
other social endowments these endowments would be random-arbitrary or capricious-arbitrary depending upon 
the circumstances.   
 
12
 Although it should be noted that since Nature (being a non-agent) cannot stack decks, natural endowments 
are, by definition, always random-arbitrary.   
8 
I (A) describe the Nozickian conception of distributive justice as it is depicted in his 
entitlement theory, (B) consider the critique of the Nozickian conception offered by Cohen, 
and (C) offer my own critique of the Nozickian conception and Cohen’s critique in line with 
the considered sense of fairness; in Section IV (Fairness and Systems of Distributive Justice) 
I (A) describe practical principles of fairness-in-distributive justice that are generated by the 
considered sense of fairness and (B) locate the system of distributive justice based upon 
considered fairness along a continuum of systems of distributive justice; and in Section V 
(Conclusion) I conclude first, that no one of the conceptions of distributive justice offered by 
Rawls, Nozick, or Cohen is truly fair, second, that the use of the considered sense of fairness 
as a major determinant in the proper distribution of primary goods in society is ethically 
unsatisfying, and, third, that rather than limit the discussion over distributive justice to an 
egalitarian-liberal-libertarian debate over what is or is not fair we would be well served to 
acknowledge and embrace other ends (like human flourishing) based on other human 
sentiments (like empathy) as we proceed with this debate regarding the proper distribution of 
primary goods in society.   
 
II. Rawls: 
A. The Rawlsian Conception of Distributive Justice: 
Rawls’s theory of distributive justice is revealed in the second principle of justice that 
he believes would be agreed to in the original position.  In its first formulation the second 
principle reads:  “social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) 
reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage, and (b) attached to positions and offices 
9 
open to all.”13  (Rawls 1999, 53).  As with the first principle of justice the second only 
applies to the “basic structure of society and govern[s] the assignment of rights and duties 
and regulate[s] the distribution of social and economic advantages.”  (Rawls 1999, 53).  The 
second principle means that “[w]hile the distribution of wealth and income need not be equal, 
it must be to everyone’s advantage, and at the same time, positions of authority and 
responsibility must be accessible to all” and is applied by “holding positions open, and then, 
subject to this constraint, arrang[ing] social and economic inequalities so that everyone 
benefits.”  (Rawls 1999, 53).   
Before embarking on a discussion of what the second principle calls for I want to 
proceed as Rawls does by sketching the development of the principle.  Recognizing that the 
phrases “everyone’s advantage” and “equally open to all” are ambiguous, Rawls describes 
three possible interpretations of the second principle:  the system of natural liberty, liberal 
equality, and democratic equality.  He then explains why he adopts democratic equality as 
the proper interpretation of the second principle.   
The system of natural liberty presupposes a background of equal liberty and requires 
“a formal equality of opportunity in that all have at least the same legal rights of access to all 
advantaged social positions.”  (Rawls 1999, 62).  Careers are open to talents but no effort is 
made to protect equality and “the initial distribution of assets for any period of time is 
strongly influenced by natural and social contingencies.”  (Rawls 1999, 62).  In other words, 
formal equality of opportunity prevails such that intentional discrimination of the “traditional 
kind” is prohibited and an efficient market economy defines what counts as a just 
                                                 
13
 The final formulation is meaningfully different in that it stresses the lexical priority of the first condition of 
the second principle, stresses “fair equality of opportunity”, and stresses the greatest benefit to the least 
advantaged:  “Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions:  first, they are to be attached to 
offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and second, they are to be to 
the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society (the difference principle).”  (Rawls 2001, 42).   
10 
distribution.  (Nagel 1991, 102; Sandel 1982, 68).  Rawls is quick to label the system of 
natural liberty unjust because it perpetuates inequalities in social and natural endowments “so 
arbitrary from a moral point of view.”  (Rawls 1999, 63).  
 The system of liberal equality adds to the notion of careers open to talents inherited 
from the system of natural liberty the further condition of the principle of fair equality of 
opportunity.  (Rawls 1999, 63).  Liberal equality counters the effects of intentional 
discrimination and social class by substantively ensuring that individuals with the same level 
of talent and ability, and the same willingness to exercise that talent and ability, will have the 
same prospects of success regardless of their initial social endowments.  (Rawls 1999, 63).14   
 Rawls clearly prefers the system of liberal equality to the system of natural liberty but 
objects to liberal equality on the basis of consistency.  He argues that since the “natural 
lottery” is just as arbitrary as the “social lottery”, there is no more reason to allow the 
distribution of wealth and income to be determined by an individual’s natural endowments 
than to allow such to be determined by an individual’s social endowments.  (Rawls 1999, 
64).  Rawls argues that “from a moral standpoint” the influence of social endowments and 
natural chance are “equally arbitrary.”  (Rawls 1999, 64-65).    
 Rawls responds to the supposed inconsistency of liberal equality by proposing a 
system of democratic equality.  This system combines fair equality of opportunity with the 
difference principle.  (Rawls 1999, 65).  The difference principle means that all of our 
talents, abilities, and the varied extent to which we are willing to work hard constitute an 
                                                 
14Rawls explains fair equality of opportunity/liberal equality more fully in Justice as Fairness when he says: 
“supposing that there is a distribution of native endowments, those who have the same level of talent and ability 
and the same willingness to use these gifts should have the same prospects of success regardless of their social 
class of origin, the class into which they are born and develop until the age of reason.  In all parts of society 
there are to be roughly the same prospects of culture and achievement for some similarly motivated and 
endowed.”  (Rawls 2001, 44). 
11 
asset owned collectively by society.  (Rawls 1999, 87).  Assuming that an unequal scheme is 
the most beneficial for everyone, the most talented, most able, and most diligent still make 
out the best in terms of wealth and income.  (Rawls 1999, 88-89; Barry 1989, 232; Cohen 
1995a, 171).  Nevertheless, the economic scheme is set up such that it will maximally help 
those in the lowest social position.  Compliance with the difference principle means that, 
“Those who have been favored by nature, whoever they are, may gain from their good 
fortune only on terms that improve the situation of those who have lost out.”  (Rawls 1999, 
87). 
 I mentioned earlier that I want to be on the lookout for this “moral arbitrariness” 
language and here it is.  Rawls rejects the natural liberty interpretation because it enables the 
distribution of assets to be strongly influenced by natural and social endowments that he 
finds morally arbitrary.  He rejects liberal equality because, even though it eliminates much 
of the impact of social endowments on distributions, it does nothing to curtail the influence 
of natural endowments.  What does all of this have to do with fairness?  Well, Rawls doesn’t 
think it unfair that people are born more or less talented (recall Footnote 1) but he does think 
that it is unfair for those people who are better endowed naturally and/or socially to benefit 
more than others do from their undeserved good fortune.15  This is why he rejects the 
lingering moral arbitrariness in the systems of natural liberty and liberal equality in favor of 
democratic equality.   
If we pause for a minute, digest all of this, reflect on this emerging Rawlsian sense of 
fairness, and forget all that we already know about the difference principle, what might we 
expect democratic equality to look like?  We might guess that Rawls is going to want to get 
                                                 
15
 Please note that in Rawls’s way of thinking it is possible to ensure that the better endowed do not benefit 
more from their undeserved good fortune than the least well off even if the holdings of the better endowed are 
always greater than those of the least well off.  More on this idea as we proceed.   
12 
rid of all of this moral arbitrariness by demanding an equal distribution of social primary 
goods even though some people are more talented than others and could command higher 
wages in the systems of natural liberty and liberal equality.  We might suppose that Rawls 
would find such an arrangement necessarily fair in that it wholly eliminates the influence of 
both social and natural endowments on the distribution of primary goods.   
Rawls’s vision of the operation of the difference principle does in fact start out much 
like the arrangement I just described (meaning complete equality) but then quickly changes.  
He asks us to imagine an initial arrangement of complete equality that we are to use as a 
prima facie just benchmark for judging “improvements.”  (Rawls 1999, 53).  A situation of 
complete equality is fair and just as far as Rawls is concerned because morally arbitrary 
factors have no influence on distributions but he allows for the possibility that other 
(“better”) states of affairs may exist that are equally just even though no longer equal in 
terms of distribution.   
What justifies an unequalizing change to this completely equal and perfectly just state 
of affairs?  Any unequalizing change is valid according to the difference principle so long as 
it benefits most the least advantaged.  Recall that our initial sense of Rawls’s intuition was 
that he wanted to eliminate the influence of all morally arbitrary factors.  Now, it seems that 
the “intuitive idea is that the social order is not to establish and secure the more attractive 
prospects of those better off unless doing so is to the advantage of those less fortunate.”  
(Rawls 1999, 65).  Rawls is saying that he’ll let the undeserving talented earn more if doing 
so benefits most the untalented—he hasn’t, in fact, eliminated the influence of morally 
arbitrary factors, he’s merely harnessing or exploiting them in a manner that he believes 
would be agreed to by the people in the original position behind the veil of ignorance.  
13 
Rawls claims that the difference principle is a “strongly egalitarian conception” and 
yet also seems fairly positive that it calls for unequal distributions.  (Rawls 1999, 65-66).  It 
is “strongly egalitarian” in the sense already mentioned that no move away from the 
benchmark of equality is warranted unless it benefits most the least well off.  Rawls seems to 
think, however, that a society guided by the difference principle is likely to maintain an 
unequal distribution of primary goods because greater pay for the more talented is likely to 
lead to a more efficient economy, greater innovation etc.  He doesn’t linger too long on the 
justifications for inequality but simply says that “[t]he point is that something of this kind 
[efficiency, innovation, etc.] must be argued if these inequalities are to satisfy the difference 
principle.”  (Rawls 1999, 68).  By definition, the unequalized economy must do better in 
some way that benefits the least advantaged or such a state of affairs will not be chosen under 
the difference principle.  Rawls suspects that the “better prospects” of the talented serve as 
“incentives” for them to work harder and more efficiently in a manner that benefits most the 
untalented.  (Rawls 1999, 68).  A point to note here then (and this will come up again) is that 
Rawls must also suspect that the talented will not work as hard or as efficiently without the 
incentive of “better prospects” as they will with the incentive of “better prospects.”   
What we need to see here is that Rawls is saying two very curious things and implying 
a third.  First, he’s saying that the talented shouldn’t necessarily earn more than the 
untalented by virtue of their assumed greater/better productivity because the social and 
natural endowments that enable that productivity are morally arbitrary (meaning 
undeserveable) (let’s call this Eliminating the Influence of Arbitrary Factors).  Second, 
Rawls is also saying that the talented should enjoy “better prospects” (earn more) by virtue of 
their assumed greater/better productivity so long as when such inequality exists the least 
14 
advantaged benefit the most and benefit more than they would in the benchmark state of 
complete equality (let’s call this Exploiting the Influence of Arbitrary Factors).  Third, Rawls 
is implying that if the talented did not enjoy “better prospects” by virtue of their greater 
natural endowments they would lack the incentive to work hard enough to render the 
unequalized state of affairs an “improvement” over the benchmark state of complete equality 
(let’s call this the Incentive Argument for Inequality).  The remainder of Section II is devoted 
to the ways in which these two claims and one implication are troubling from the standpoint 
of fairness and theoretical coherence.   
B. Nozick’s Critique of Rawls: 
I want to delay discussion of Nozick’s entitlement theory until Section III and only focus 
here on what he has to say specifically about eliminating or exploiting the influence of 
arbitrary factors and about the incentive argument for inequality.  Nozick is useful for 
understanding (at least) two things about Rawls’s theory:  first, he helps us to recognize that 
Rawls really isn’t in the business of eliminating the influence of inequalities in natural 
endowments and he identifies the tension that exists between Rawls’s desire to nullify 
morally arbitrary factors by means of the original position and his decision to give larger 
shares to the talented; and, second, he (Nozick) questions the fairness of a conception of 
social cooperation in which the terms of cooperation are dictated to those who contribute the 
most to the cooperative effort by those who contribute the least to the cooperative effort. 
Nozick notes that “Rawls makes many scattered references to [the] theme of nullifying 
the accidents of natural endowment and the contingencies of social circumstance” and rejects 
the systems of natural liberty and liberal equality because they allow distributions to be 
influenced by natural endowments and social endowments “so arbitrary from a moral point 
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of view.”  (Nozick 1974, 215).  He attempts to rebuild Rawls’s positive argument by asking 
the question: “How might the point that differences in natural endowments are arbitrary from 
a moral point of view function in an argument meant to establish that differences in holdings 
stemming from differences in natural assets ought to be nullified?”  (Nozick 1974, 216).  As 
Nozick continues to build and discount arguments it becomes clearer and clearer that the 
influence of morally arbitrary factors on distributions is not eliminated by the conception of 
distributive justice that Rawls offers.  Nozick then attributes to Rawls the idea that 
“differences between persons…are arbitrary from a moral point of view if there is no moral 
argument for the conclusion that there ought to be differences” and summarizes the operation 
of the difference principle as follows: 
1. Holdings ought to be equal, unless there is a (weighty) moral reason why 
they ought to be unequal. 
2. People do not deserve the ways in which they differ from other persons in 
natural assets; there is no moral reason why people ought to differ in natural 
assets. 
3. If there is no moral reason why people differ in certain traits, then their 
actually differing in these traits does not provide, and cannot give rise to, a 
moral reason why they should differ in other traits (for example, in 
holdings). 
 
Therefore,  
 
4. People’s differing in natural assets is not a reason why holdings ought to be 
unequal. 
5. People’s holdings ought to be equal unless there is some other moral reason 
(such as, for example, raising the position of the worst off) why their 
holdings ought to be unequal.   (Nozick 1974, 222).  
  
Unlike inequalities in social endowments and social contingencies which are nullified or 
eliminated by the condition of fair equality of opportunity in the second principle of justice, 
inequalities in natural endowments are not nullified but rather exploited by the difference 
principle because, apparently, there is a good enough moral reason to do so.   
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According to Rawls, the positive influence of the greater natural endowments of the 
talented on their holdings is justified because the inequalities that result work to the benefit 
of everyone.  Even though the talented need the incentive of “better prospects” in order to 
ensure the greater economic benefit of everyone the benefit ultimately redounds most to the 
least advantaged.16  This stimulation of the talented toward greater production is the manner 
in which inequalities in endowments are exploited rather than simply nullified or eliminated.  
Nozick is certainly aware of this choice on the part of Rawls to exploit rather than to 
eliminate and to dangle incentives in front of the talented.  This is, in many ways, what gets 
him the foot in the door that he needs in order to criticize the cooperative dynamic of the 
difference principle.   
Nozick questions the fairness of the scheme of social cooperation required by the 
difference principle.  He asks us to imagine three states of affairs:  non-cooperation, 
partitioned-cooperation, and full-cooperation.  (Nozick 1974, 193-95).  In the non-
cooperative state the talented and untalented do not cooperate with each other or amongst 
themselves and the talented earn T1 and the untalented earn U1 (where T1 > U1).  Under the 
scheme of partitioned cooperation the talented and untalented do not cooperate with each 
other but do cooperate amongst themselves and the talented earn T2 and the untalented earn 
U2 (where T2>T1,  U2>U1, and T2>U2 ).  Finally, under the scheme of full-cooperation the 
talented and untalented cooperate amongst themselves and with each other and the talented 
earn T3 and the untalented earn U3 (where T3>T2>T1, U3>U2>U1, and T3>U3).  Nozick 
suggests that in determining which group, the talented or the untalented, benefits more from 
                                                 
16
 Meaning that when you compare the Rawlsian state of inequality with the Rawlsian state of complete equality 
that the extent to which untalented do better in the former state as compared to the latter state is greater than the 
extent to which the talented do better in the former state as compared to the latter state even though the talented 
do better in ultimate terms (earn more and possess greater holdings) than the untalented in the Rawlsian state of 
inequality.   
17 
the scheme of general cooperation it makes sense to compare the groups’ mean incremental 
gains in going from the state of partitioned-cooperation to full-cooperation.  In other words, 
asking whether the difference between T3 and T2 is larger or smaller than the difference 
between U3 and U2.  Nozick speculates that since the  
the better-endowed group includes those who manage to accomplish something of great 
economic advantage to others, such as new inventions, new ideas about production or 
ways of doing things, skill at economic tasks, and so on, it is difficult to avoid concluding 
that the less well endowed gain more than the better endowed do from the scheme of 
general cooperation.  (Nozick 1974, 194, emphasis in original).  
 
Nozick is saying that T3-T2 (the benefit of full-cooperation for the talented) is less than U3-
U2 (the benefit of full-cooperation for the untalented) and all of this in the context of the 
scheme of general cooperation and before the application of the difference principle.  Given 
his speculation about the untalented getting the better end of the full-cooperation deal to 
begin with he is left with “a deep suspicion of imposing, in the name of fairness, constraints 
upon voluntary social cooperation (and the set of holdings that arises from it) [the difference 
principle] so that those already benefiting most from this general cooperation benefit more!”  
(Nozick 1974, 194-95).   
 Nozick then pounces on Rawls at this point wanting to know why it is that the 
talented do not have grounds to complain about this situation.  He wonders how Rawls would 
respond if it was the talented who said the following:  “‘Look, worse endowed: you gain by 
cooperating with us.  If you want our cooperation you’ll have to accept reasonable terms.  
We propose these terms:  We’ll cooperate with you so long as we get as much as possible.  
That is, the terms of our cooperation should give us the maximal share such that, if it was 
tried to give us more, we’d end up with less.’”  (Nozick 1974, 195).  In Nozick’s reading of 
A Theory of Justice all that Rawls seems to do with this possibility is to suggest that the 
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talented, wanting the untalented to cooperate, would decide to be reasonable and not make 
such one-sided demands.   
 Rawls does have a better answer for Nozick.  He claims that the talented find the 
difference principle reasonable because “they regard themselves as already compensated, as 
it were, by the advantages to which no one (including themselves) had a prior claim.”  
(Rawls 1999, 88).  Nozick criticizes Rawls for suggesting that the talented should be content 
with the difference principle when they already contribute the most and benefit the least from 
cooperation.  Rawls says that the talented don’t complain about this state of affairs because 
they feel fully compensated to begin with and that the difference principle is fortified by a 
sense of fraternity between the talented and untalented.  (Rawls 1999, 88-91).   
What then are we to make of the incentive argument for inequality?  We begin to see that 
it becomes hard for Rawls to argue that the benchmark of equality is fair but that the 
inequality that benefits most the untalented is also fair.  Even if we stick with Rawls’s own 
sense of fairness it begins to look like he must be either treating the talented unfairly by 
admitting that they need “better prospects” as an incentive to cooperate with the untalented 
but also claiming that they should not benefit most from cooperation or treating the 
untalented unfairly by allowing the talented to have more than the untalented even though 
they (the talented) supposedly think of themselves as already having been compensated 
through fortune alone.  On the one hand, we might conclude that it is the talented who are 
being cheated in the sense that they make less than they would if they could ever benefit as 
much or more than do the untalented from the scheme of social cooperation let alone the 
difference principle (a greater amount they could easily secure by virtue of their dominant 
position within the social cooperation relationship).  On the other hand, we might agree that 
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the talented are fully compensated by fortune and conclude that, therefore, it is the untalented 
who are being cheated out of what more they could have in terms of holdings were “better 
prospects” abolished and the talented actually treated like they’ve already been fully 
compensated.   
It is here that we begin to see Rawls struggling to compensate for the extent to which his 
own sense of fairness fails to comport with other senses of fairness (like the one that I and 
others ascribe to) in the midst of pursuing unacknowledged ends other than fairness.  He 
doesn’t actually want to eliminate the influence of moral arbitrary natural endowments on 
holdings but rather exploit those endowments in a manner that he deems fair on the basis of 
its selection by the people in the original position.  My speculation is that Rawls is 
uncomfortable with the idea of dispensing with “better prospects” for the talented because it 
strikes him as unfair and unrealistic not to offer them greater pay for highly productive work 
that benefits most the untalented even if the reason they are capable of doing such great work 
is the result of their morally arbitrary natural endowments.  Either the talented are fully 
compensated by virtue of fortune or they are not and “better prospects” are only necessary if 
Rawls does not fully reject the view that the talented are entitled to at least some of the fruits 
of their lucky natural endowments.  (Rawls 1999, 88-89).   
 Walking this tightrope between subtle concessions to entitlement and practicality on the 
one hand and his desire to dispense with moral arbitrariness on the other leaves Rawls 
vulnerable to attack in terms of both the coherence of his theory and in terms of his 
commitment to fairness.  Such vulnerability in Rawls’s conception will become increasingly 
apparent as we turn to Cohen’s critique.  Keep in mind however that while Nozick and 
Cohen are right to point out Rawls’s failings in terms of theoretical coherence and in terms of 
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his sense of fairness, they too fall short of recognizing the potential disutility of fairness as a 
major determinant in the distribution of primary goods.   
C. Cohen’s Critique of Rawls: 
Cohen’s “root belief is that there is injustice in distribution when inequality of goods 
reflects not such things as differences in the arduousness of different people’s labors, or 
people’s different preferences and choices with respect to income and leisure, but myriad 
forms of lucky and unlucky circumstance.”17  (Cohen 1997, 12).  This “root belief” leads him 
to the very interesting position of accepting what he calls a “strict” interpretation of the 
difference principle and rejecting the “lax” Rawlsian interpretation of the difference 
principle.  Cohen believes that the difference principle, properly construed, requires almost 
complete equality and that it unfairly favors the talented in the context of Rawls’s 
misapplication of his own theory.   
Cohen refers to the Rawlsian construction of the difference principle that he would 
disprove as the Pareto Argument for Inequality.  It is a two-stage argument the first stage of 
which he accepts and the second stage of which he rejects:  
(1) First Stage: 
(a) First Thought:  “true equality of opportunity is achieved only when all morally 
arbitrary causes of inequality are eliminated”18   
(b) Second Thought:  “there exist no causes of inequality that are not arbitrary in the 
specified sense”19  
(2) Second Stage:  we come to the argument “which pleads that inequality is indeed just 
when and because it has the particular consequence that it causes everyone to be 
better off.”  
                                                 
17
 Unlike Rawls, Cohen is not content to merely exploit the influence of morally arbitrary natural endowments 
on distributions.   
 
18
 Cohen says “I take it, a cause of inequality is ‘morally arbitrary’ if it does not justify that inequality because 
of the kind of cause that it is” and suggests that such unjustifiable causes for Rawls and Rawlsians would be 
things like desert and entitlement.  (Cohen 1995a, 161-62).   
 
19
 Here we have reached the prima facie just benchmark of complete equality.   
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(a) First Thought:  “it is irrational to insist on equality when it is a Pareto-inferior20 state 
of affairs (why would anyone, and, in particular, the worst off, prefer equality to an 
inequality in which everyone is better off?)” 
(b) Second Thought:  “sometimes, and indeed typically, equality is Pareto-inferior.”  
(Cohen 1995a, 161-62, emphasis in original). 
As you will see, the large claim that Cohen wants to make here is that there is a Pareto-
improving and equality-preserving move that Rawls could and should make that he does not 
make because he cannot bring himself to definitively reject desert and entitlement.   
 Cohen invites us to consider three alternative schemes, D1, D2, and D3.  (Cohen 
1995a, 169-72).  D1 stands for the Rawlsian initial situation of equality of primary goods 
which serves as the benchmark against which all other feasible schemes are to be judged.  
Cohen concludes that the benchmark is under-described in that it tells us nothing of the labor 
inputs into the system by the talented and the untalented alike and nothing about the relative 
burdensomeness of the work done by each group.  He assumes for the purposes of his 
thought experiment that both the talented and the untalented apply the same effort over the 
same period of time meaning that it is the talented that are more productive by virtue of their 
greater social and natural endowments.  Despite the greater productivity of the talented, 
under the D1 scheme both groups receive the same wage, W.21  
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 Cohen understands the Pareto definitions as follows:  “State A is strongly Pareto-superior to state B if 
everyone is better off in A than in B, and weakly Pareto-superior if at least one person is better off and no one 
is worse off.  If state A is Pareto-superior to state B, then state B is Pareto-inferior to state A.  State A is 
Pareto-inferior (tout court) if some state is Pareto-superior to A.  State A is Pareto-optimal if no state is Pareto-
superior to state A:  it is strongly Pareto-optimal if no state is weakly Pareto-superior to it, and weakly Pareto-
optimal if no state is strongly Pareto-superior to it.  States A and B are Pareto-incomparable if neither is (even 
weakly) Pareto-superior to the other. A change is a weak Pareto-improvement if it benefits some and harms 
none, and a strong Pareto-improvement if it benefits everyone.  The Pareto principle mandates a Pareto-
improvement whenever one is feasible: the strong principle mandates (even) weak Pareto-improvements, and 
the weak only strong Pareto-improvements.”  (Cohen 1995a, 160fn4).   
 
21
 Cohen acknowledges that many would regard paying both the more productive talented and less productive 
untalented as unfair.  He notes, however, that in Rawls’s view (as well as his own) “the greater output of the 
more able is here to be regarded as due to the morally arbitrary circumstance of their lucky talent endowment, 
which is among the factors whose effects are to be discounted in the argument for initial equality.”  (Cohen 
1995a, 171).  
22 
 D2 then stands for a Pareto-superior scheme that Rawls would choose over the 
situation of initial equality because it leaves everyone better off than in the initial situation.  
Here Cohen imagines that the talented now work more intensely leading to greater 
productivity and benefit to spread around and that the talented are accordingly rewarded with 
Wt while the untalented work no more intensely and yet receive Wu where Wt>Wu>W.22  D2, 
the Pareto-superior scheme (relative to D1) that would be chosen by operation of the 
difference principle, rewards the talented with the highest wage Wt as an incentive for them 
to work hard and benefit most the untalented.  (Cohen 1995a, 171; Barry 1989, 232-33).   
 With what Rawls has said about fraternity and the talented already feeling 
compensated by fortune in the back of his mind, Cohen then wonders why it is that the 
talented should receive a higher wage than the untalented.  In this vein, he imagines a third 
scheme, D3, in which the talented work with their D2 heightened intensity and both the 
talented and the untalented make We where Wt>We>Wu>W.  Assuming the feasibility of D3 
and the willingness of the talented to produce as well as they can given their greater natural 
endowments the equal scheme of D3 is a Pareto-improving move23 that preserves equality 
and results in a situation in which no one is as badly off as some are in D2 (We being greater 
than Wu).  (Cohen 1995a, 172).  
 Cohen reasons that if D1 is fair to the talented as far as Rawls is concerned then there 
is no reason why D3 should not also be fair.  It is true that the talented are working harder 
than the untalented under D3.  It is also true that they should earn more for working harder 
under D3 than they do under D1 and they do because We is a higher wage than W.  Rather 
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 I think that we can also assume that Nozick would claim that the difference between Wu and W is most likely 
greater than the difference between Wt and Wu.   
 
23
 D3 is Pareto-superior to D1 and Pareto-incomparable to D2.   
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than go with We for both, Rawls is, in effect, suggesting a rate of pay for the talented, Wt 
(which is higher than the wage for the untalented Wu), that could only be secured by the 
talented by virtue of the bargaining power associated with their superior talent.  (Cohen 
1995a, 174).  But none of that makes any sense when you consider the way that Rawls 
understands morally arbitrary advantages.  If the talented cannot be heard to complain that 
they deserve a higher wage than the untalented on account of their greater productivity at D1 
then they cannot be heard to complain that they deserve a higher wage than the untalented on 
account of their even greater productivity at D3.  Rawls’s decision to exploit rather than to 
eliminate the influence of natural endowments on distributions indicates that he is less 
willing than is Cohen to completely dismiss desert or entitlement.   
After such a deep critique of Rawls it may be hard to believe that Cohen actually accepts 
the difference principle.  His acceptance comes as a result of his conclusion that  
the difference principle in a society of just people would not induce the inequality it is 
usually thought (e.g. by Rawls) to produce, and it would not, in particular, justify 
incentive payments in the ‘standard’ sense of the phrase…that is, payments not to 
compensate for unusually arduous work, but to draw talent to jobs that are not generally 
especially grueling.  (Cohen 1991, 316).    
 
Cohen’s belief is that it is only when Rawls gives up on the sense of justice that inspires the 
difference principle and is supposed to pervade his just community that incentive payments 
come into play.  His “strict” interpretation of the difference principle would not merely select 
“a tax function that maximizes the income return to the worst off people” but would mean (as 
Rawls himself implied) that the “talented would not expect (what they usually have the 
power to obtain) the high salaries whose level reflects high demand for their talent.”  (Cohen 
1997, 9; Cohen 1991, 316).  In Cohen’s version there would be no exploitation of natural 
endowments or “better prospects” for the talented.  The talented and untalented alike would 
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be paid at the same wage rate (the influence of natural endowments eliminated) and people 
would only earn more or less depending upon the arduousness of their work and/or their 
decisions regarding the appropriate balance of work and leisure.   
D. Rawls and His Critics Measured Against the Considered Sense of Fairness: 
Some of the analytical flaws evident in Rawls’s theory arise in part from his inability to 
completely disregard the considered sense of fairness which leads him to want to only 
partially eliminate the influence of natural endowments on holdings even though he 
completely eliminates the influence of even random-arbitrary social endowments and 
contingencies.  These flaws and the superficiality of the critiques of Nozick and Cohen result 
from the failure of all three to clearly distinguish between that which is unfair and that which 
is merely undeserved (between that which is capricious-arbitrary and that which is random-
arbitrary) as well as their failure to explicitly recognize and privilege ends other than 
fairness.  Coming from different ends of the spectrum, Nozick and Cohen both show some of 
the ways in which Rawls’s conception is unfair.  That they are both right about the unfairness 
evident in Rawls’s theory illustrates the manner in which my the considered sense of fairness 
actually straddles the viewpoints of all three theorists.  That Nozick and Cohen are likewise 
incapable of tracking the considered sense of fairness further illustrates their 
unacknowledged pursuit of ends other than fairness and the danger of constraining the debate 
over proper distributions to the language of fairness.   
I want to be careful about how much I bring Nozick into the discussion at this point 
because we have yet to go through his entitlement theory of justice.  Nozick will serve for 
now simply as one who disagrees with the idea that fairness requires the elimination or 
exploitation of the influence of natural endowments on distributions but agrees with the 
25 
elimination or rectification of the influence of certain social endowments on distributions.  
This will place Cohen then at the other end of the spectrum as one who believes that fairness 
requires the elimination of the influence of all natural endowments, social endowments, and 
social contingencies on distributions.  Finally, Rawls will occupy a point between Nozick 
and Cohen (significantly closer to Cohen) as one who believes that fairness requires the 
elimination of the influence of social endowments and social contingencies on distributions 
and the exploitation of the influence of natural endowments on distributions.   
 In order to understand the distinctions between Rawls, Cohen, and Nozick let’s 
consider Alice, a talented and able-bodied worker who was raised in a wealthy family whose 
wealth was neither positively nor negatively impacted by discrimination or any other kind of 
force or fraud.  When Rawls sees the Alices of the world and their morally arbitrary natural 
and social endowments he wants to do two things:  first, he wants to ensure that no other 
similarly talented laborer is prevented from achieving what it is that Alice can achieve 
because he was born into a less fortunate social endowment, and, second, he wants to offer 
the Alices of the world “better prospects” such that they are willing to work harder for the 
greatest benefit of the least advantaged.  When Cohen sees the Alices of the world and their 
morally arbitrary natural and social endowments he wants them to recognize that their innate 
talents and acquired ability to innovate and produce great things for society are merely the 
products of luck, are wholly undeserved, and that by no means should any of that luck render 
their distributions any larger than those of anyone else.  When Nozick sees the Alices of the 
world he wants to do nothing at all but sit back and let them do their thing for society even if 
that means that the Alices are able to bargain for higher salaries on account of their larger 
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contribution to the joint product of social cooperation and even though their ability to 
contribute more is, at least in part, attributable to luck.   
With regard to Alice, at least, I believe that the considered sense of fairness is in 
complete agreement with Nozick.  The description of her background reveals only random-
arbitrary unstacked-deck kinds of endowments (natural and social) and, therefore, 
eliminating or exploiting any of these endowments would be capricious and unfair (see 
Footnote 6).  If we eliminated or exploited any of Alice’s endowments we would be treating 
a random-arbitrary situation in a capricious-arbitrary manner by stacking the deck against 
Alice (as when Rawls corrects for avowedly not unjust natural facts—see Footnote 1).  To be 
clear this is true not only when Alice is required to settle for a wage that is less than she 
could negotiate for in good faith (whether or not it is higher than (Rawls) or equal to (Cohen) 
that of the rest of society) but also to the extent that she is required to subsidize society’s 
efforts to ensure that other similarly talented but less socially endowed members of society 
receive roughly the same prospects of culture and achievement (what Rawls calls fair 
equality of opportunity).   
Now let’s consider Bob, a talented and able-bodied worker who was raised in a 
wealthy family whose wealth was positively impacted by discrimination.  Rawls and Cohen 
want to treat Bob just like they treat Alice because they make no distinction between the 
impact of merely undeserved luck and unfair discrimination upon an individual’s social 
endowments and social contingencies.  Nozick is unwilling to eliminate or exploit Bob’s 
natural endowments but may be willing to somehow rectify the influence of discrimination 
on Bob’s holdings.  The considered sense of fairness holds that Bob’s natural endowments 
are random-arbitrary and their influence should be neither eliminated nor exploited but would 
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call for the elimination of the influence of his social endowments (or at least that part of his 
social endowments that could be connected to discrimination) on his distribution.  The Bobs 
of the world serve as an example of Situation A, in that (some part of) Bob’s holdings are 
like stolen property24 and unfairly held, and the considered sense of fairness justifies 
remedying the situation by taking away Bob’s metaphorical $20 (or whatever part of his $20 
was “stolen”).   
Finally, let’s consider Carol, an untalented woman disabled from birth who cannot 
work on account of her disability.  She was raised in a family of modest wealth whose wealth 
was neither positively nor negatively impacted by discrimination or any other kind of force 
of fraud.  Rawls wants Carol to have the same prospects of culture and achievement as those 
similarly motivated and endowed.  Cohen treats Carol just like Bob and Alice—luck should 
have no impact on her life prospects.25  Nozick sees no force or fraud in this situation, does 
not recognize an issue for fairness or justice, and so (probably) would not do anything to 
augment Carol’s distribution leaving her to the mercy of private charity.  The considered 
sense of fairness (fairness again, not what I think that we ought to do) sees nothing but 
random-arbitrary natural and social endowments in Carol’s case and, like Nozick, would not 
do anything to augment Carol’s distribution.  Carol’s situation is clearly unfortunate but as 
far as the considered sense of fairness is concerned there is no unfair to fix, there is no deck 
to unstack, and no agents to hold accountable.  Her predicament simply isn’t a matter of 
fairness—it’s merely a matter of bad luck just as Alice’s circumstance is merely a matter of 
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 Discrimination, even when it does not take the form of enslavement or the outright theft of goods, amounts to 
the theft of property in the sense that it is an anti-competitive way of discounting the value of a person’s labor.  
When you discriminate against me you steal from me the value of the time and energy that I could trade for 
primary goods.  I believe that this is what Nozick means when he says that it is unjust to “forcibly exclud[e] 
others from competing in exchanges…”  (Nozick 1974, 152). 
   
25
 What Rawls or Cohen would do in practical terms is very unclear.   
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good luck.  The Alices and Carols of the world represent different ends of the Situation B 
spectrum—Alice is lucky and stumbles across $20 on the sidewalk while Carol is unlucky 
and drops $20 onto the sidewalk.  Both situations are undeserved but neither is unfair 
because there is no bad agent that we can point to.  If we demand that Alice give Carol $20 
or $10 we cannot justify our demand with the considered sense of fairness which treats as 
unfair the augmenting of a merely underserved not-unfair thing like Alice’s possession of the 
$20.  The considered sense of fairness also does not justify giving all or some part of Bob’s 
metaphorical $20 to Carol because Carol’s social endowments were not negatively impacted 
by the discrimination that positively impacted Bob’s social endowments.  (All or some part 
of Bob’s $20 goes to another individual Dave whose family’s wealth was negatively 
impacted by the discrimination which positively impacted Bob’s social endowments even if 
Dave happens to be more talented and his family more wealthy than Carol, Bob, or even 
Alice.)   
My point, again, isn’t about right and wrong so far it is about how well the 
distributive justice visions of Rawls, Nozick, and Cohen comport with the considered sense 
of fairness.  Through Alice, Bob, and Carol we can see that not only do these theorists 
disagree with each other but they also largely disagree with the considered sense of fairness 
(even though Nozick gets disturbingly close at times in somewhat unclear ways).  The point 
to understand then is that they can’t (meaning shouldn’t) disagree with the considered sense 
of fairness on fairness grounds because the considered sense of fairness is fairness—it 
ensures unstacked decks but does nothing at all about “bad hands” and, most importantly, 
recognizes the necessity of agency in fairness determinations.  The unacknowledged 
concerns of Rawls, Cohen, and Nozick here are with something more or something different 
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than fairness.  Rawls doesn’t really want to be fair to the talented or to the untalented but 
instead he strikes a balance between the two that is unfair to both groups but appears to him 
as the right solution based on his original position thought-experiment.  He eliminates the 
influence of some properly held and completely just social endowments and exploits natural 
endowments which are, by definition, not unfairly acquired.  Cohen treats unfairly those 
whose wealth was generated without force or fraud by eliminating the influence of both 
natural and social endowments without any concern for the random-arbitrary nature of all 
natural endowments and many social endowments.  Nozick, for his part, is somewhat harder 
to pin down as we will see in the next section but stands fairly close to the considered sense 
of fairness even if it is far from clear that he’d be willing to eliminate the influence of all 
capricious-arbitrary social endowments on distributions as the considered sense of fairness 
would require.    
 
III. Nozick: 
A. The Nozickian Conception of Justice in Holdings: 
Nozick would rather not think of his entitlement theory as a theory of distributive justice.  
He contends that “distributive justice” is a non-neutral term in the sense that it implies the 
existence of “some thing or mechanism that uses some principle or criterion to give out a 
supply of things.”  (Nozick 1974, 149).  It also follows from the implication of “distribution” 
that redistribution might be warranted in cases where some error has crept into the 
distribution of shares.  Nozick disputes the notion that there exists some form of central 
distribution—some person or group that is entitled to control all resources and to decide how 
they should be doled out.  To him, a free society is one in which “[w]hat each person gets, he 
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gets from others who give to him in exchange for something, or as a gift.”  (Nozick 1974, 
149).   
The entitlement theory is, then, a theory about the correct view of justice in holdings, not 
justice in distribution.  Nozick’s theory consists of three principles:  the principle of justice in 
acquisition, the principle of justice in transfer, and the principle of rectification of injustice in 
holdings.  (Nozick 1974, 150-53).  The principle of justice in acquisition concerns the 
manner in which unheld things may come to be held26, the principle of justice in transfer 
concerns the processes by which a person may transfer holdings to another and how a person 
may acquire a holding from another who holds it, and the principle of rectification of 
injustice in holdings concerns the rectification of violations of the first two principles.  
(Nozick 1974, 150-52).   
According to Nozick, in a wholly just world this inductive definition would 
“exhaustively cover the subject of justice in holdings”:   
1. A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle of justice 
in acquisition is entitled to that holding.  
2. A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle of justice 
in transfer, from someone else entitled to the holding, is entitled to the 
holding. 
3. No one is entitled to a holding except by (repeated) applications of 1 and 2.  
(Nozick 1974, 151).  
The important insight offered here is that a distribution of holdings is necessarily just “if it 
arises from another just distribution by legitimate means” or, said in another way, “whatever 
arises from a just situation by just steps is itself just.”  (Nozick 1974, 151).  As we will see 
this is an insight with which Cohen disagrees.   
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 As with the other two principles Nozick has very little to say about what the principle of justice in acquisition 
would actually look like.  That said, he does discuss Locke’s theory of acquisition and assumes that any 
adequate theory of justice in acquisition would include a Lockean proviso such that no one could, for instance, 
appropriate (or purchase) all of the drinkable water in the world.  (Nozick 1974, 178-9).  Nozick also believes 
that it is very unlikely that the free operation of a market system will run afoul of the Lockean proviso.  (Nozick 
1974, 182).   
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 The fact of the matter is though that the world is most definitely not “wholly just.”  In 
the real world “some people steal from others, or defraud them, or enslave them, seizing their 
product and preventing them from living as they choose, or forcibly excluding others from 
competing in exchanges” and “none of these are permissible modes of transition from one 
situation to another.”  (Nozick 1974, 152).  Situations such as these (like Situation A) are 
violations of Nozick’s first two principles and require rectification.  As with the other two 
principles, the principle of rectification is merely sketched by Nozick and is severely 
underdescribed.  He does say, however, that the principle is meant to do three things:  First, it 
“uses historical information about previous situations and injustices done in them…and 
information about the actual course of events that flowed from these injustices, until the 
present, and it yields a description (or descriptions) of holdings in society”;  second, it makes 
“use of its best estimate of subjunctive information about what would have occurred…if the 
injustice had not taken place”; and, third, “if the actual description of holdings turns out not 
to be one of the descriptions yielded by the principle, then one of the descriptions yielded 
must be realized.”  (Nozick 1974, 152-53).  Conspicuously (though avowedly) absent from 
Nozick’s discussion of rectification are considerations about how, if at all, things change if 
the beneficiaries and those made worse off by the injustice are descendants of the parties to 
the injustice and how far we must go back into history etc.27   
 Nozick clearly has very little to say about the substance of his proposed principles.  
His major contribution does not come in the form of a detailed rival theory to that of Rawls 
but in illustrating the framework for such a theory based on “historical” as opposed to “end-
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 It should be noted that Nozick (in 1974) remarks that he does “not know of a thorough or theoretically 
sophisticated treatment of such issues” but includes a footnote that says “See, however, the useful book by 
Boris Bittker, The Case for Black Reparations (New York: Random House, 1973).”  (Nozick 1974, 152 and 
152fn2).   
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result” principles.  Nozick’s entitlement theory is historical in that it determines whether or 
not a distribution is just based upon how that distribution came about (just steps yield a just 
distribution and one unjust step yields an unjust distribution).  By contrast, end-result 
principles of justice determine whether or not a distribution is just based on how things are 
actually distributed according to some structural principle(s) of just distribution (think the 
difference principle as both Rawls and Cohen conceive of it).  (Nozick 1974, 153).  The 
historical principles of the entitlement theory hold that past circumstances or actions, rather 
than the structural landscape of current holdings, “create differential entitlements or 
differential deserts to things.”  (Nozick 1974, 155).   
 Nozick also distinguishes between a subclass of historical principles which are 
patterned and a subclass of historical principles which are non-patterned.  A principle is 
patterned “if it specifies that a distribution is to vary along with some natural dimension, 
weighted sum of natural dimensions, or lexicographic ordering of natural dimensions” and a 
distribution is patterned if it accords with a patterned principle.  For example, one could 
specify that a distribution is to vary along with I.Q., or with I.Q. and moral merit either 
lexicographically or as a weighted sum, and a distribution that accorded with that principle 
would be patterned.  Nozick believes that almost every suggested principle of distributive 
justice is patterned and stresses that his entitlement theory is not.  He believes that his theory 
is non-patterned because the entitlement principle does not specify a distribution that varies 
along any natural dimension or combination of natural dimensions.  (Nozick 1974, 156-57).  
Holdings are acquired and distributed merely on the basis of Nozick’s first two principles and 
redistributed when they are not.     
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 Nozick’s next move is to illustrate the manner in which liberty upsets patterned 
distributions and, on the basis of his illustration, question whether those holding alternative 
conceptions of distributive justice can reject his entitlement theory.  He seeks to illustrate this 
point with his famous Wilt Chamberlain example which is meant to show that it is only by 
suppressing liberty and taking from people what they not unfairly possess that patterns can be 
maintained.  To accomplish this Nozick introduces his own D1 in which distributive shares 
can be equal as Cohen might like or they can vary in accordance with some dimension like 
the difference principle as Rawls might like—the point is that the pattern satisfies whoever it 
is that is imposing the patterned principle.  I quote the Wilt Chamberlain illustration at length 
because it is important for this discussion of Nozick’s entitlement theory as well as for 
Cohen’s critique:   
Now suppose that Wilt Chamberlain is greatly in demand by basketball teams, being 
a great gate attraction…He signs the following sort of contract with a team:  In each 
home game, twenty-five cents from the price of each ticket of admission goes to 
him…The season starts, and people cheerfully attend his team’s games; they buy their 
tickets, each time dropping a separate twenty-five cents of their admission price into a 
special box with Chamberlain’s name on it…Let us suppose that in one season one 
million persons attend his home games, and Wilt Chamberlain winds up with 
$250,000, a much larger sum than the average income … Is he entitled to his income?  
Is this new distribution D2, unjust?  If so, why?  There is no question about whether 
each of the people was entitled to the control over the resources they held in D1; 
because that was the distribution…that (for the purposes of argument) we assumed 
was acceptable.  Each of these persons chose to give twenty-five cents of their money 
to Chamberlain….If D1 was a just distribution, and people voluntarily move from it 
to D2, transferring parts of their shares they were given under D1 (what was it for if 
not to do something with?), isn’t D2 also just?  If the people were entitled to dispose 
of the resources to which they were entitled (under D1), didn’t this include their being 
entitled to give it to, or exchange it with, Wilt Chamberlain?  (Nozick 1974, 161-62).  
The main point to glean from the Wilt Chamberlain illustration is that distributions like 
Rawls’s D1 and Cohen’s D3 discussed above cannot be continuously realized without 
suppressing liberty (you may not transfer as you wish) or without taking from people that 
which they not unfairly possess (you must return resources others freely chose to transfer to 
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you).  Clearly Nozick believes that Chamberlain is entitled to his $250,000 salary and is 
completely unconcerned with whether or not it is a morally arbitrary fact about the world that 
Chamberlain possesses once-in-a-lifetime natural gifts.  Chamberlain is a stand-in for the 
talented or the lucky and the fact that members of an egalitarian society might freely choose 
to introduce inequality in connection with the exercise of their liberty makes one wonder 
whether or not it is truly unfair that someone as talented as Chamberlain has greater holdings 
than many others or truly unfair that he is able to earn more than many others even if him 
earning more does not redound to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged.  Nozick isn’t 
particularly explicit on the fairness issue here (relying more on the shock value of the 
restraint of liberty) but I think we can understand him as questioning the unfairness of 
(almost) any unequalized state of affairs that has arisen by just steps or by just steps and 
rectified unjust steps.   
B. Cohen’s Critique of Nozick and Nozick and Cohen Measured Against the 
Considered Sense of Fairness: 
Cohen attacks the claim that whatever arises from just steps is itself just.  His claim is 
that just steps are not necessarily justice-preserving and that “common or garden ‘innocent’ 
market transactions are not justice-preserving.”  (Cohen 1995b, 40).  Cohen believes that he 
can give us examples of just steps that yield unfair and unjust results and lead us to reject 
Nozick’s entitlement theory of justice in holdings.  
Cohen’s argument is unconvincing due in large part to the fact that he and Nozick are 
speaking a completely different language.  They are speaking different languages about 
justice and what is or is not justice-preserving because they don’t agree about what is or is 
not unfair.  Nozick sticks very close to the ethically unsatisfying considered sense of fairness 
while Cohen imports concerns for unacknowledged ends other than fairness into the 
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discussion in a way that he thinks trumps Nozick’s arguments.  By the end of Cohen’s 
discussion though it becomes clear that neither he nor Nozick stays within the lines of the 
considered sense of fairness in all instances and at all costs (Cohen almost always goes 
beyond it and Nozick even finds one reason to demand more from his own theory).   
 Cohen places way too much faith in the notion that “justice-subverting misadventure” 
can show us how it is that just steps are not necessarily justice-preserving.  He contends that 
injustice in situation “does not presuppose wrongdoing” and “that it could result from 
misadventure.”  (Cohen 1995b, 43).  Consider two “petty” illustrations of this idea offered by 
Cohen:   
The Rolling Pin:  “imagine that one of my justly held rolling pins rolls out of my 
front door and down the hill and through your open door, without your knowledge.  
You innocently mistake it to be the one you mislaid, and you keep it and use it.”  
(Cohen 1995b, 43). 
The Diamond:  “I sell a diamond to you for a pittance, a diamond that we both think 
is glass”…and it turns out to be an actual diamond.  (Cohen 1995b, 45).   
 
Cohen believes that both of these examples illustrate “situational-injustice” arising from 
nothing but just steps.  His larger argument is that when “we widen our focus, away from 
discrete pairs of transacting agents to the mass of uncoordinated transactions that occurs in a 
market economy, then the scope of justice-subverting misadventure due to ignorance 
becomes large.”28  (Cohen 1995b, 45-46).  Cohen’s point is that “accidents, lack of relevant 
foreknowledge, and foreknown combinatorial processes may reasonably be regarded as 
producers of situational injustice.”  (Cohen 1995b, 46).   
 Cohen is also quick to point out that Nozick himself is not completely unmoved by 
misadventure.  (Cohen 1995b, 46).  When Nozick acknowledges that he would apply the 
Lockean proviso to the case where someone comes to be the monopoly holder of all of the 
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 Rawls, for one, is inclined to agree.  (Rawls 2001, 52-53).   
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world’s drinking water he is compensating for a misadventure that arose through nothing but 
just steps.  (Nozick 1974, 180).  Cohen is right here to suggest that Nozick is willing to fix a 
misadventure but wrong to think that Nozick’s sense of fairness leaves him vulnerable to the 
rolling pin and diamond examples.  Nozick is presumably disturbed by the monopoly holder 
of the world’s drinking water not because it is mere misadventure but because it is a very 
serious kind of misadventure that could render life itself overwhelmingly difficult.  It should 
also be acknowledged as mentioned above that Nozick doubts that the Lockean proviso 
would ever be necessary in a free and open market economy.  (Nozick 1974, 182).   
 Nozick would be unmoved by Cohen’s examples because nothing in his principle of 
acquisition or of transfer (aside from the Lockean proviso) would prohibit misadventure.  
The notion of “situational injustice” has no meaning in the context of a theory, like Nozick’s 
entitlement theory, which is based upon how-things-come-to-held and not about ensuring that 
every person continue to hold everything she doesn’t intend to lose or mistakenly transfer.  
From the standpoint of fairness and justice Nozick would be untroubled by the lost rolling 
pin and by the mistaken sale of a diamond for a pittance.  
 The question remains then are we troubled by misadventure?  Of course we are but is 
it the considered sense of fairness that makes us feel troubled?  I don’t believe that it is.  If 
we apply the considered sense of fairness to Cohen’s examples I think that we are likewise 
unmoved.  Think back to Situation B.  Imagine that the $20 that I find lying on the sidewalk 
is the same $20 that you mistakenly dropped earlier in the day.  Does that in any way alter 
Situation B such that we now find my being $20 richer and you being $20 poorer unfair 
rather than merely undeserved?  The considered sense of fairness would treat this additional 
information as wholly immaterial because (as Nozick understands) there was no bad act, 
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there was no unjust step.  Fairness, rightly understood, is not impacted by misadventure or by 
so-called “situational injustice.”     
 It is evident then that Nozick, by embracing the Lockean proviso, shows that not even 
he lacks the compassion necessary to conceive of distributive justice solely in terms of the 
considered sense of fairness.  Cohen on the other hand can’t ever resist demanding far more 
than the considered sense of fairness would allow and require (and Rawls demands more as 
well, if not as much as Cohen).  As I’ve mentioned before, I believe this unwillingness on the 
part of all three theorists to be restrained by the considered sense of fairness results from their 
overwhelming desire to pursue ends other than fairness and reinforces my concern about the 
disutility of continuing to frame this debate about how holdings ought to be distributed in 
terms of fairness.   
 
IV. Fairness and Systems of Distributive Justice:  
A. The Principles of Fairness: 
We know from the above discussion that a system of distributive justice comports with 
the considered sense of fairness if and only if the following criteria are met:  first, the 
influence of natural endowments29 and random-arbitrary social endowments and social 
contingencies on holdings is neither eliminated nor exploited; and, second, the influence of 
capricious-arbitrary social endowments and social contingencies on holdings is completely 
eliminated.  I now want to say a little bit more about the practical principles of fairness-in-
distributive-justice that are generated by this fairly abstract insight.   
A commitment to the elimination of the influence of capricious-arbitrary social 
endowments and social contingencies on holdings implies two principles of distributive 
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 Remember that natural endowments are, by definition, always random-arbitrary.   
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justice.  The first principle (the meritocratic principle) provides for the opening of careers to 
talents and comprehensive non-discrimination while the second principle (the rectificatory 
principle) provides for comprehensive and historically precise affirmative action and 
reparations.  Together these two principles eliminate the influence of capricious-arbitrary 
endowments or contingencies on holdings without introducing any unfairness through the 
elimination or exploitation of the influence of any random-arbitrary endowments or 
contingencies on holdings.   
We open careers to talents by removing the legal and formal barriers to advancement by 
qualified individuals and achieve comprehensive non-discrimination by removing the extra-
legal and informal barriers to advancement by qualified individuals.  Everyone is free from 
every kind of discrimination—every element of force or fraud that discounts the value of a 
person’s labor is comprehensively prohibited.  Nevertheless, the term “qualified” remains 
meaningful and the meritocratic principle is in no way concerned with how or why it is that a 
particular person happens to possess the degree of innate talent and/or acquired skill 
necessary to pursue a particular career.   
Comprehensive and historically precise affirmative action and reparations target those 
individuals whose social endowments have been negatively impacted by discrimination that 
positively impacted the social endowments of others.30  Fair affirmative action means that we 
require special preferences for only those candidates who may be less than optimally 
qualified whose social endowments have been negatively impacted by discrimination over 
only those candidates whose social endowments have been positively impacted by 
discrimination.  Likewise, a fair system of reparations means that we require only those 
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 I can think of no form of discrimination that negatively impacts the social endowments of some that does not 
also positively impact the social endowments of others.   
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whose social endowments have been positively impacted by discrimination to compensate 
only those whose social endowments have been negatively impacted by discrimination to no 
greater or lesser degree than the full value of the discrimination.   
Let’s consider our archetypal examples in order to get a sense of what all of this means in 
practice.  We know that the meritocratic principle means that Alice, Bob, Carol, and Dave 
must not suffer from any form of discrimination, that it is likely that no one of them is 
qualified for every career, and that it is possible that Carol is not qualified for any career.  We 
also know that the rectificatory principle means that Dave must be preferred as a candidate 
over Bob even if Dave is not optimally qualified, that Dave must not be preferred as a 
candidate over Alice or Carol, that Bob may be required to compensate Dave for the full 
value of his family’s discrimination, and that neither Alice nor Carol need to compensate 
Dave in any way.  Schematically, the considered sense of fairness requires the following 
(note that I’ve added two new individuals, Erica and Fred, in order to express additional 
dimensions of what fairness requires):  
Individual Endowments Effect of the Two Principles 
Alice Born with talent and born into a wealthy 
family whose wealth was not positively 
impacted by discrimination  
Enjoys comprehensive non-discrimination, is not 
automatically qualified for any career, no other 
individual must be preferred as a candidate over her, 
and she owes no compensation to any individual.  
Bob  Born with talent and born into a wealthy 
family whose wealth was positively 
impacted by discrimination  
Enjoys comprehensive non-discrimination, is not 
automatically qualified for any career, Dave must be 
preferred as a candidate over him, and he may owe 
compensation to Dave. 
Carol  Born with a severe disability and into a 
family of modest wealth whose wealth 
was not positively impacted by 
discrimination 
Enjoys comprehensive non-discrimination, is not 
automatically qualified for any career (and may not be 
qualified for any career), no other individual must be 
preferred as a candidate over her, and she owes no 
compensation to any individual. 
Dave Born with talent and born into a wealthy 
family whose wealth was negatively 
impacted by discrimination 
Enjoys comprehensive non-discrimination, is not 
automatically qualified for any career, no other 
individual must be preferred as a candidate over him, 
must be preferred as a candidate over Bob, Erica, and 
Fred, and may be owed compensation by Bob, Erica, 
and/or Fred. 
Erica Born without talent and born into a poor 
family whose wealth was positively 
Enjoys comprehensive non-discrimination, is not 
automatically qualified for any career, Dave must be 
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impacted by discrimination  preferred as a candidate over her, and she may owe 
compensation to Dave. 
Fred Born with a severe disability and into a 
poor family whose wealth was 
positively impacted by discrimination 
Enjoys comprehensive non-discrimination, is not 
automatically qualified for any career (and may not be 
qualified for any career), Dave must be preferred as a 
candidate over him, and he may owe compensation to 
Dave. 
 
This table expresses three things about the two principles of distributive justice implied by 
the considered sense of fairness:  first (and as promised), they neither eliminate nor exploit 
the influence of natural endowments or random-arbitrary social endowments on holdings; 
second, they demand the elimination of the influence of capricious-arbitrary social 
endowments even when doing so benefits an individual (Dave) that is already naturally and 
socially well-endowed; and, third, they demand the elimination of the influence of 
capricious-arbitrary social endowments even when doing so works to the detriment of those 
who are not well-endowed  socially and/or naturally (consider Erica and Fred).   
B. A Continuum of Systems of Distributive Justice: 
If we think of the system of distributive justice implied by the considered sense of 
fairness as a point along a continuum of possible systems we can see that every other system 
above or below is unfair in some fashion(s).  Those systems to one side of considered 
fairness are unfair to the extent that they do not eliminate the influence of capricious-
arbitrary factors on holdings and those to the other side are unfair to the extent that they do 
eliminate or exploit the influence of random-arbitrary factors on holdings.  We end up with a 
continuum starting with natural liberty and ending with Cohen’s conception of democratic 
equality that looks like this: 
System of Distributive 
Justice 
Attributes Treatment of Arbitrariness 
Natural Liberty --Careers are open to talents 
--Discrimination prohibited 
The influence of natural 
endowments and social 
contingencies on holdings is 
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neither eliminated nor exploited; 
the influence of capricious-
arbitrary social endowments on 
holdings is partially eliminated 
Nozick’s Justice in Holdings --Careers are open to talents 
--Discrimination (comprehensively?) 
prohibited 
--The influence of force or fraud on 
holdings is (somehow and to some 
degree) rectified 
The influence of natural 
endowments and random-arbitrary 
social endowments and social 
contingencies on holdings is 
neither eliminated nor exploited; 
the influence of capricious-
arbitrary social endowments (and 
social contingencies?) on holdings 
is (largely?) eliminated 
Considered Fairness --Careers are open to talents 
--Discrimination comprehensively 
prohibited 
--The influence of force or fraud on 
holdings is rectified through 
comprehensive and historically precise 
affirmative action and reparations 
The influence of natural 
endowments and random-arbitrary 
social endowments and social 
contingencies on holdings is 
neither eliminated nor exploited; 
the influence of capricious-
arbitrary social endowments and 
social contingencies on holdings is 
completely eliminated 
Liberal Equality --Careers are open to talents 
--Discrimination prohibited 
--Fair equality of opportunity ensured31   
The influence of natural 
endowments on holdings is neither 
eliminated nor exploited; the 
influence of all social endowments 
and social contingencies on 
holdings is completely eliminated  
Rawls’s Democratic Equality --Careers are open to talents 
--Discrimination prohibited 
--Fair equality of opportunity ensured 
--Unequalized distributions provide 
incentives to the talented to work hard 
and must benefit most the least well off 
The influence of all social 
endowments and social 
contingencies on holdings is 
completely eliminated; the 
influence of natural endowments 
on holdings is exploited for the 
greatest benefit of the least well off 
Cohen’s Democratic Equality --Careers are open to talents 
--Discrimination prohibited 
--Fair equality of opportunity ensured 
--Unequalized distributions result only 
from differences in the arduousness of 
work and decisions regarding the 
appropriate balance of work and leisure 
The influence of all social 
endowments, social contingencies, 
and natural endowments on 
holdings is completely eliminated  
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 Please note that the requirements of fair equality of opportunity (in many respects) exceed the comprehensive 
and historically precise affirmative action and reparations called for by the considered sense of fairness.  Here, 
again, is Rawls’s conception of fair equality of opportunity:  “supposing that there is a distribution of native 
endowments, those who have the same level of talent and ability and the same willingness to use these gifts 
should have the same prospects of success regardless of their social class of origin, the class into which they are 
born and develop until the age of reason.  In all parts of society there are to be roughly the same prospects of 
culture and achievement for some similarly motivated and endowed.”  (Rawls 2001, 44).   
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I can’t be sure that Nozick’s theory is properly placed along this continuum and I think that 
that fact is important for a number of reasons.  I say that I’m not sure about Nozick’s 
placement because his theory is profoundly underdetermined and because he includes a 
Lockean proviso (something eminently reasonable that the considered sense of fairness 
would disallow).  I doubt that Nozick would (fully) follow the comprehensive non-
discrimination element of the meritocratic principle or the affirmative action and reparations 
elements of the rectificatory principle implied by considered fairness but I can’t be sure.  
What I do know is that in at least one instance (the Lockean proviso) and possibly more even 
the libertarian Nozick cannot stomach the results of considered fairness.   
 Even if we assume that Nozick would not agree that Dave should be preferred as a 
candidate over Fred, Erica, or even Bob and that he should not be compensated by Fred, 
Erica, or even Bob we still have to wonder how he would treat the severely disabled Carol 
and Fred.  Both were born with and not into their severe disabilities32 and so the value of 
their labor has not been discounted by the force or fraud of any agent.  Would Nozick agree 
to redistribute some holdings in order to at the very least contribute to the likelihood that 
Carol and Fred lead minimally decent lives or would he leave such matters to the charitable 
impulses of better endowed individuals?  It isn’t important that we come to a conclusion 
about what Nozick would do but it is important to see the ethical difficulties that might arise 
from the actual pursuit of fairness as the greatest end even for a proponent of an ultra-
minimalist state.   
C. The Discourse of Fairness: 
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 Please recall that those attributes that we are born with but that result from social factors are treated as social 
endowments rather than natural endowments (e.g. children born with AIDS or addicted to drugs).   
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I’ve made the analytical point that Rawls, Nozick, and Cohen use the language of fairness 
but fail to understand or provide for the actual implications of the considered sense of 
fairness.  I also want to say that we’re not only dealing with conceptual flaws here but with 
an ethically flawed discourse.  I want to make it clear just how disappointing actual fairness 
is and to suggest that violating fairness in the name of fairness also shields us from 
recognizing, analyzing, and debating an analytically coherent and ethically satisfying theory 
of the proper (though definitely unfair and possibly unjust) distribution of primary goods in 
society.   
I don’t simply favor Rawls or Cohen over Nozick because their conceptions of 
distributive justice definitely seem to have the effect of yielding greater benefit to Carol, 
Erica, and Fred (our least well-endowed).  I worry that because Alice, Bob, and Dave are 
right to call each of their conceptions unfair that we find ourselves in an egalitarian-liberal-
libertarian stalemate that leaves everyone feeling cheated and only some truly flourishing.  
As long as this argument turns along the axis of fairness we may never recognize that Carol 
and Fred definitely need our help and that Dave and Erica probably do as well—not 
(necessarily) because we are responsible for their unenviable conditions33 but because we 
empathize with their situations and feel that we ought to set things right.  If we fixate on 
fairness we lose our grasp on the compassion that we feel toward our fellow human beings 
and think instead about why in the world I should pay to ease a pain that I did not cause with 
                                                 
33
 According to Schmidtz, when dealing with natural endowments we fix problems not injustices:  “Being born 
with a cleft palate is a problem.  The problem is not that a cleft palate is unjust but that it is bad.  Its badness 
gives us some reason to intervene to fix the problem.  But note the real issue:  We are not trying to fix an 
improper distribution of cleft palates.  We are trying to fix cleft palates.”  (Schmidtz 2006, 219, emphasis in 
original).  Here, Schmidtz too is motivated by another unarticulated end or ends.  Even if he doesn’t say 
whether it is empathy or something else which he thinks should motivate us to help those who not unfairly face 
problems in life at least he recognizes that the discourse of fairness is theoretically and practically ill-equipped 
to get us where we want to go.   
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my unstolen $20 (Nozick) or why I should ever pay just $20 when I have $40 to spare 
(Cohen).   
I am not content with Rawls or Cohen over Nozick because they too get it wrong and 
give us an even less clear sense of what fairness is and how dangerous it can be.  At least 
Nozick is fairly honest about what fairness looks like and what its effects would be even if he 
is wrong not to be appalled by the result.  Until we recognize (within this debate over 
distributive justice) the unacknowledged and highly warranted pursuit of ends other than 
fairness (like actual human flourishing) we’ll just continue barking up the wrong tree.   
 
V. Conclusion:  
I started this thesis with a claim about the considered sense of fairness and I used that 
claim in order to test the fairness or lack thereof evident in the fairness-based conceptions of 
distributive justice offered by Rawls, Nozick and Cohen.  I then used the response of Nozick 
to Rawls and the responses of Cohen to Rawls and Nozick in order to show that each of their 
conceptions lack theoretical coherence and that no one of them tracks the considered sense of 
fairness (although Nozick comes disturbingly close).  I also used archetypal examples in 
order to draw out the practical implications of the considered sense of fairness in order to 
express the manner in which fairness would impact actual people. Finally, and using those 
same examples, I also sought to make it clear that fairness is ethically unsatisfying as a major 
determinant in the proper distribution of primary goods and to introduce the claim that we 
would be well served to acknowledge and embrace other ends (like human flourishing) based 
on other human sentiments (like empathy) as we proceed with this debate regarding the 
proper distribution of primary goods in society.  
45 
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